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Sjak Smulders† , Edwin van der Werf‡
Abstract
We study how restricting CO2 emissions affects resource prices and
depletion over time. We use a Hotelling-style model with two non-
renewable fossil fuels that differ in their carbon content (e.g. coal and
natural gas) and that are imperfect substitutes in final good produc-
tion. We study both an unexpected constraint and an anticipated
constraint. Both shocks induce intertemporal substitution of resource
use. When emissions are unexpectedly restricted, it is cost-effective to
use high-carbon resources relatively more (less) intensively on impact
if this resource is relatively scarce (abundant). If the emission con-
straint is anticipated, it is cost-effective to use relatively more (less) of
the low-carbon input before the constraint becomes binding, in order
to conserve relatively more (less) of the high-carbon input for the pe-
riod when climate policy is active in case the high-carbon resource is
relatively scarce (abundant).
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Substitution from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources may allow an
economy to reduce carbondioxide (CO2) emissions at lower cost. For ex-
ample, a country can build gas-fuelled powerplants instead of coal-fuelled
powerplants to meet the demand for energy and still reduce polluting emis-
sions. Questions that arise in the presence of a limit to CO2 emissions are
whether there should be a transition towards a ’low-carbon economy’, and
whether we should leave the stocks of coal in the ground, at least for a while.
In a standard static partial equilibrium setting, a CO2 emission tax affects
the user cost of high-carbon energy more than that of low-carbon energy
and substitution will take place towards the low-carbon energy. We show
that in the more appropriate dynamic setting, with energy coming from
non-renewable resource stocks, the results are quite different. Extending
the canonical non-renewable resource model with a second resource, we find
that a binding CO2 emission constraint not necessarily calls for substitution
towards low-carbon in the short run, but - depending on a well-defined mea-
sure of scarcity of the two resources - may instead call for relatively more
intensive high-carbon use in the short-run and less of it in the long run.
Taking the current global policy regarding global warming as a start-
ing point, we study the effect of a constant ceiling on carbondioxide emis-
sions (’Kyoto forever’) on fossil fuel extraction when the government uses
a cost-effective instrument. We not only study the effect of an unexpected
emissions ceiling but we also investigate an anticipated emission constraint,
which comes closer to the case of the Kyoto Protocol where the first commit-
ment period in which countries are supposed to have reduced their emissions
is 2008-2012. We build a model that is as close as possible to the standard
non-renewable resource model and distinguish between two non-renewable
resources that are imperfect substitutes in production, for example coal and
natural gas. In addition the two resources differ in carbon content (per unit
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of energy), as in the process of energy generation more carbondioxide per
unit of energy is emitted with the use of coal than with the use of oil or gas.
We build our arguments on the fact that high-carbon and low-carbon
inputs are imperfect substitutes at an aggregate level. Substitution be-
tween different types of products implies indirect substitution between en-
ergy types and types of fossil fuels. If the transport sector shifts from road
transport to rail, this is implicitly a change in the fossil fuel mix as trucks
use oil-based products while the railsector uses electricity, which can be
generated by gas-fuelled powerplants. Also the powerplants themselves can
substitute between fossil fuel types: although for an individual powerplant
the choice between coal and gas is a binary one, the point of indifference be-
tween the two inputs may differ for several powerplants, leading to imperfect
substitution at the industry level.
We show that relative extraction in the constrained economy not only
depends on the carbon content of the two inputs, but also on their relative
productivity and availability. Because the emissions come from the use of
non-renewable resources, an emission constraint ceases to be binding when
the remaining resource stocks have become sufficiently small. The best
way to cope with an emission constraint is to intertemporally reallocate
the extraction of the two given resource stocks such that production per
unit of carbondioxide emissions is relatively high at the time the emission
constraint is binding, and low when the constraint no longer (or - in the case
of an anticipated constraint - not yet) binds. Hence the constrained economy
uses the resource with the lowest amount of emissions per unit of output
relatively more intensively, as compared to an unconstrained economy and
this resource is not necessarily the resource with lowest amount of carbon
per unit of energy.
The option of substituting low-carbon for high-carbon fuels to meet cli-
mate targets has been studied analytically in Chakravorty et al. (2005b)
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and numerically in Chakravorty et al. (1997). The latter paper develops
a numerical integrated assessment model with several non-renewables (oil,
coal and natural gas), multiple energy demand sectors and a clean renewable
resource. The authors simulate three scenarios for technical change with op-
timal climate policy and conclude that ”under any reasonable scenario for
technological change, most of the earth’s coal resources will never be used.
Oil and natural gas, however, are both completely exhausted in all three sit-
uations.” (Chakravorty et al., 1997, p. 1225). However, they do not report
the paths of extraction of the individual resources, nor do they identify the
forces underlying their results. In Chakravorty et al. (2005b) climate policy
consists of an exogenous ceiling on the stock of pollution. A high- and a
low-carbon fossil fuel are perfect substitutes, together with a clean backstop
technology, in energy generation. Unless it has been exhausted before, only
the low-carbon input is used until the ceiling on the stock of pollution is
achieved. From this instant on first the low-carbon input is used, possi-
bly followed by a period in which both inputs are used simultaneously, and
finally only the high-carbon input is used.
Most theoretical papers studying climate policy and fossil fuel extraction
use a single (polluting) non-renewable resource. Withagen (1994) extends
the standard Hotelling (1931) model with stock externalities from resource
use and a utility function that is separable in utility from resource use and
disutility from the stock of pollution. A social planner assures that the
marginal benefits of fuel use equals the marginal costs, including environ-
mental damage. Withagen shows that the optimal, monotonically decreasing
extraction path has initially less extraction than in the pure mining model,
but more extraction later on. Grimaud and Rougé (2005) treat pollution as
a flow and extend the model with an innovating sector to have endogenous
growth. They confirm Withagen’s conclusions.
A second branch of theoretical papers has both a polluting non-renewable
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and a non-polluting backstop technology. Tahvonen (1997) extends With-
agen’s model with extraction costs and a backstop and shows that, if the
initial stock of externalities is low enough, the extraction path of the non-
renewable may have an inverted U-shape form. In a related paper, Chakra-
vorty et al. (2005a) study the effects of an exogenous ceiling on the stock of
emissions on the use of the non-renewable resource and the backstop tech-
nology during and after the period that the constraint is binding. The ex-
ogenous price of the backstop relative to the emission constraint determines
the optimal allocation. Few papers study imperfect substitution between
non-renewable resources. Exceptions are Beckmann (1974) and Hartwick
(1978), but these early studies are not concerned with carbon emissions.
The only paper, to our knowledge, that studies the effect of an announced
emission constraint is by Kennedy (2002). Using a two-period model without
resources he shows that it may be optimal for a small country to reduce
emissions before the 2008-2012 commitment period, either because of co-
benefits (e.g. reductions in emissions of other pollutants than CO2 that
go together with a reduction in fossil fuel combustion) or because early
investments in physical capital help reducing adjustment costs.
The remainder of the paper develops as follows. After presenting our
model in section 2, we study the economy without any form of climate policy.
In section 4 we study an unexpected and initially binding constant CO2
emission ceiling. Section 5 presents the effects of an announced constraint.
We conclude in section 6. The appendix contains proofs of propositions and
technical details.
2 The model
Our economy consists of three groups of agents, who all take prices as given.
Consumers maximize intertemporal utility by buying final goods and trad-
ing assets, which are claims to the resource stocks. Producers maximize
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profits by buying two resource inputs to produce and sell a homogeneous
final good. In addition each producer has a number of tradable emission
permits. Resource extractors maximize intertemporal profits by extracting
(at zero extraction cost) the two non-renewable resources, which are sold
to producers in the final goods industry. Although we present the results
for the decentralized economy with regulation through tradable pollution
permits, it can be shown that the planner that wishes to maximize utility
subject to an exogenous emission constraint chooses exactly the same allo-
cation. Hence, the setting we study is one of cost-effective environmental
regulation.
The representative consumer derives utility from final good Y and faces
an intertemporal budget constraint: dV (t) /dt = r (t) V (t) − Y (t). Here





lnY (τ) · e−ρτdτ, (1)
where ρ is the utility discount rate. Maximizing (1) subject to the intertem-
poral budget constraint implies the following Ramsey rule:
Ŷ (t) = r (t)− ρ. (2)
where, as in the remainder of this paper, the hat denotes the growth rate
(Ŷ = d lnY/dt).
The competitive final goods industry produces Y from two fossil fuel
inputs, H and L, both scaled to units of energy, according to the following
constant returns to scale CES technology (we suppress the time argument














where Ri is the amount extracted of resource i ∈ {H, L} , ηH and ηL are
positive technology parameters and σ ∈ (0,∞) is the constant elasticity
of substitution. The use of fossil fuels causes emissions of carbondioxide.
The two inputs differ in their CO2 emission intensity per unit of energy
and we denote the (constant) CO2 emission coefficients of H and L by
εH and εL respectively, with εH > εL so that H is the relatively dirty or
high-carbon input. The total amount of emissions is denoted by Z.1 If the
economy is subject to an emissions constraint, total emissions cannot exceed
a maximally allowed amount Z̄, according to the following constraint:
εHRH (t) + εLRL (t) = Z (t) ≤ Z̄. (4)
As we are interested in the reaction of the economy to the constraint rather
than in optimal climate policy itself, we assume that the constraint Z̄ is
exogenous. The government allocates tradable emission permits over pro-
ducers in the final goods industry, who trade them at a market price pZ
and buy resources of type i at price pRi. The price of the final good is nor-
malized to one for every period. Firms maximize profits and the first order







= pRi + εipZ . (5)
This equation states that the marginal revenue from resource input i (the
marginal product at the left-hand side) equals its marginal cost (the user
price at the right-hand side), which consists of the price of the resource
augmented with the cost of pollution in case the constraint is binding.2
1Our notation is consistent with the measurement of Ri in units of energy and Z in
units of carbon. By rescaling Ri and/or Z it is possible to normalize - without loss of
generality - three of the four parameters εL, εH , ηL, and ηH , to unity. However, for the
sake of ease of interpretation we do not apply this normalisation.
2Note that we will always have an interior solution. If Ri = 0 we would have Y = 0
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The two fossil fuels are extracted from stocks of non-renewable resources,
SH and SL respectively, according to




where Si0 is the initial stock of resource i. Resource owners maximize the net
present value of profits from exploiting the non-renewable resource stocks,
taking resource price pRi as given. Extraction costs are assumed to be zero
so the resource price is a pure scarcity rent. For each of the resources this
results in the familiar Hotelling rule:
dpRi/dt = r · pRi. (7)
From this we see that the relative resource rent pRH/pRL will be constant
over time, as both rents grow at the same rate.
We are now ready to study extraction of the two resources. We first study
extraction in an economy without a CO2 emission constraint and then move
to a constrained but otherwise identical economy.
3 The economy without (the prospect of) climate
policy
Suppose that from some instant T (possibly equal to 0) on the economy is
unconstrained and does not expect future climate policy. In this case the
economy is described by a pure depletion or cake eating model from t = T
on (see e.g. Heal, 1993). If we write the firms’ optimality conditions (5) with
for σ ≤ 1, and ∂Y/∂Ri = ηi (Y/Ri)1/σ → ∞ for σ > 1 which violates (5) for finite pRi
and pZ .
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pZ = 0 in growth rates and combine them with the Hotelling and Ramsey
rules we find the growth rates of extraction:
R̂H = R̂L = Ŷ − r = −ρ ∀ t ≥ T, (8)
That is, extraction and emissions decrease at a rate equal to the utility dis-
count rate. After integrating (8) and imposing the constraint that forward-
looking resource owners anticipate that eventually all reserves will be sold,
we find that the extraction rates of the two resources can be expressed as:
Ri (t) = ρSi (t) ∀ t ≥ T. (9)
Consequently total emissions equal
Z(t) = ρ · (εHSH(t) + εLSL(t)) ∀ t ≥ T (10)
(see (4)). According to (8) and (9), relative extraction is constant over time






∀ t ≥ T. (11)
From the first order conditions (5) and equilibrium relative extraction (11)











These results reveal that as long as the economy is unconstrained and
does not expect future climate policy, relative extraction in the uncon-
strained economy is constant and equals relative stocks at each point in
time. Since conservation of both resource stocks requires that resource own-
ers earn the same return on the two resources, both resource prices grow at
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the common rate r in equilibrium. Hence, the relative price is constant over
time and the CES production function then implies that relative demand
is constant as well. As resource owners want to fully exploit the available
reserves, stock dynamics require relative extraction to equal relative stocks
which implies that the initial relative scarcity rent in an unconstrained econ-
omy is determined by initial availability of the resources.
4 An unexpected emission constraint
We now introduce an unexpected ceiling on emissions in the model. The
ceiling is introduced at time t = 0 and is binding by then. It will stay at
the level Z̄ forever, which is known by all agents (’Kyoto forever’). The
constraint will not bind forever, though, since resource stocks, from which
emissions stem, are depleted over time (cf. (10)). We define t = T as the
instant from which onward total emissions cease to be constrained. Hence,
pZ(t) = 0 for any t ≥ T and, from (4) and (9), εHρSH(T )+ εLρSL(T ) = Z̄.
The total amount of CO2 that will be emitted from t = 0 on can be written
as
εHSH0 + εLSL0 = [εH (SH0 − SH(T )) + εL (SL0 − SL(T ))]
+εHSH(T ) + εLSL(T ).
Using the fact that the term in square brackets represents total emissions
in the period that the economy is constrained (which equals TZ̄), and that
from the definition of T the sum of the other terms at the right-hand side








Clearly, a larger initial stock or a stricter environmental policy implies a
longer period of being restricted. A lower discount rate, and hence more
patient consumers, implies that the economy is suffering the constraint for
a shorter period as the economy tends to extract and pollute less (see (10)).
The economy’s behaviour after the constraint ceases to be binding is
described in the previous section. Therefore we can now focus on how the
two stocks of fossil fuels will be exploited when the CO2 emission constraint
binds. The development of relative extraction in the constrained economy
with an unannounced emission constraint is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose a CO2 emission constraint is unexpectedly intro-
duced at time t = 0. Let T denote the instant at which the constraint ceases
to be binding and define S̄ = (ηHεL/ηLεH)σ . Then
1. if SH0/SL0 < S̄,
(a) SH (t) /SL (t) < RH (t) /RL (t) < S̄ for all t ∈ (0, T );
(b) pRH (t) /pRL (t) > (ηH/ηL) (SH0/SL0)
−1/σ > εH/εL for all t ≥ 0;
(c) d(SH (t) /SL (t))/dt < 0 for all t ∈ (0, T );
(d) d(RH (t) /RL (t))/dt < 0 for all t ∈ (0, T );
(e) RH (T ) /RL (T ) = SH (T ) /SL (T ) < SH0/SL0;
(f) limt↓0 RH (t) /RL (t) > limt↑0 RH (t) /RL (t) = SH0/SL0;
2. if SH0/SL0 > S̄, all strict inequalities in part 1 are reversed;
3. if SH0/SL0 = S̄, all strict inequalities in part 1 are replaced by equali-
ties;
4. if SH0/SL0 6= S̄,
(a) limt↑0 Z(t)/Y (t) > limt↓0 Z(t)/Y (t);
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(b) limt↑0 Z(t)/Y (t) < Z(T )/Y (T );
(c) d(Z(t)/Y (t))/dt > 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ];
(d) d(Z(t)/Y (t))/dt = 0 for all t > T .
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition states that if the high carbon resource is physically
relatively scarce, in particular if SH0/SL0 < S̄, then at the instant that
emissions become unexpectedly restricted, the relative scarcity rent of this
scarce high-carbon input (pRH/pRL) jumps up, and its relative use (RH/RL)
first jumps up and then gradually declines to a level that is lower than
before (see 1(e)). As a consequence the high-carbon resource is physically
even scarcer in the long run, which explains the upward jump in the relative
scarcity rent. If the high carbon resource is relatively abundant, in particular
if SH0/SL0 > S̄, the reverse happens. Nevertheless, in both cases, on impact
the restriction on emissions results in a lower emission intensity, Z/Y , which
then gradually increases.
We illustrate the paths of extraction for the case in which SH0/SL0 < S̄,
corresponding to part 1 of the proposition, by the thick arrows in Figure 1.
The constrained economy moves along line Z̄, at which emissions are at the
imposed ceiling and which is defined by RH = (Z̄ − εLRL)/εH . Since the
economy moves to lower production isoquants, pollution per unit of GDP
increases over time. The unconstrained economy, which according to (9)
extracts a constant fraction of each available stock, moves down along a ray
from the origin with slope SH0/SL0.
The proposition shows that on impact substitution is not necessarily to
the ’environmentally clean’ low-carbon input but to the relatively scarce in-
put, and that this substitution reduces pollution per unit of output (part
4 of the proposition). In particular, on impact substitution is towards the




































Figure 1: Extraction paths for S̄ > SH(0)/SL(0): the unconstrained econ-
omy and the economy with an unannounced constraint






≡ S̄ (that is, if high carbon resources are relatively
scarce).3 In this sense, we can define the ’economically clean’ input to be the
relatively scarce input j for which Sj0/S−j0 < (ηjε−j/η−jεj)σ, as opposed
to the environmentally clean input i for which εi < ε−i. Intuitively, the
scarce resource cannot unlimitedly be used intensively because it is avail-
able in relatively low quantities. When used less intensively, its marginal
productivity is high and substituting towards it increases output per unit of
3Note that although the proposition only specifies how relative extraction evolves over
time, extraction of each of the two resources follows directly: when constrained total
emissions equal Z̄, so that RH and RH/RL move in the same direction, while RL and
RH/RL move in opposite directions.
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emissions. The downside of such substitution is that the resource becomes
even scarcer so that in the future its use has to be reduced and pollution
intensity will rise. However, this occurs when the cost of emissions is low or
(after T ) even zero, so that this intertemporal substitution of resource use
reduces the cost of complying with the carbon constraint.
Since no non-renewable resource can be forever used more intensively,
the direction of substitution between resource use after the ceiling is im-
posed contrasts with the substitution on impact. If the emission constraint
on impact triggers faster extraction of one resource, this resource must be
extracted at a slower pace later on, since a given stock restricts cumulative
extraction. As a result, climate change policy cannot make production less
high-carbon intensive forever, as is stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If SH0/SL0 6= S̄, there is always a period when the constraint
is binding and at the same time the high-carbon input is used relatively more
intensively in the economy with an emission constraint than in the economy
without.
Proof. Proposition 1, (a) and (e) in part 1 and 2 imply RH(0)/RL(0) ≶
SH0/SL0 ≶ RH(T )/RL(T ) in an economy with binding emission constraint,
while (11) implies RH(t)/RL(t) = SH0/SL0 in an economy without.
To explore the mechanisms behind our results, we divide (5) for the














where ζ = pZεL/(pRL + pZεL) is the share of pollution costs in the user
price of low-carbon resources. This equation reveals that relative demand
for energy sources depends on the relative user price, which is a weighted
average of relative scarcity rents and relative pollution costs (right-hand side
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expression of (14)). As a result, relative energy use is naturally bounded by
relative scarcity rents (which reflect the physical availability of the resources)
and relative pollution costs.
Over time, the share of pollution cost in the user price ζ falls, since
scarcity rents increase and the price of pollution permits falls. Relative
scarcity rents (pRH/pRL) and pollution costs (εH/εL) are constant over time
(see (12)). Therefore, the relative user price of high-carbon resources may
rise or fall over time depending on the sign of εH/εL − pRH/pRL (see (14)).
If εH/εL < pRH/pRL, as in part 1 of the proposition, the relative user
price of high-carbon resources increases over time. Intuitively, with this
inequality the high-carbon resource is relatively costly mainly because of
scarcity cost rather than pollution cost, and this resource benefits the least
from declines in pollution costs. Users then gradually substitute towards
the low-carbon resource during the period that the emissions constraint is
binding. In the opposite situation with (εH/εL > pRH/pRL) the high-carbon
resource mainly benefits from pollution price reductions and users gradually
substitute to the high-carbon resource.4
The following corollary summarizes the implication of our results that
climate policy does not always increase the relative user price of the high-
carbon input: climate policy only increases the relative user price of carbon
inputs if the high-carbon input is physically relatively scarce.
Corollary 2. Define the user price of resource i as pRi + εipZ . Suppose a
binding emission constraint is unexpectedly introduced. Then
1. if SH0/SL0 < S̄, the relative user price of high-carbon resources drops
4The relative scarcity rent is endogenous, so that we cannot directly determine the sign
of εH/εL−pRH/pRL. However, the proposition shows that if equilibrium relative resource
rent without constraint falls short of relative pollution costs, this applies a fortiori in the
constrained economy: using notation as defined at the start of the appendix, we have
p(0−) = ηS−1/σ0 < ε ⇔ S0 < S̄ from (12), so that p(0+) > ε from proposition 1, part
1(b).
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on impact and increases while the economy is constrained.
2. if SH0/SL0 > S̄, the relative user price of high-carbon resources jumps
up on impact and decreases while the economy is constrained.
3. if SH0/SL0 = S̄, the relative user price is constant over time.
Proof. Follows from (14) and parts 1-3(d) of Proposition 1.
As climate policy is a delicate political topic it is likely to be subject
to changes in its stringency over time. If the emission constraint becomes
tighter, pollution costs become a more important determinant in the cost of
resource use as compared to scarcity rents, ceteris paribus. As a consequence
the relative extraction rate jumps closer towards S̄ (where S̄ is the level that
would apply if scarcity did not matter), as is stated by the following claim:
Proposition 2. Suppose a binding CO2 emission constraint Z̄1 that ceases
to be binding at t = T1 is introduced at time t = 0. Suppose that at time
t = t2 ∈ (0, T1) the constraint is unexpectedly changed to Z̄2 and still binding.
If SH0/SL0 6= (η/ε)σ and Z̄2 < Z̄1, then5
1. the economy is unconstrained at
t ≥ T2 ≡ [εLSL0+εHSH0]Z̄2 −
1
ρ − t2 Z̄1−Z̄2Z̄2 > T1;
2. relative extraction jumps according to∣∣∣∣limt↓t2RH (t) /RL (t)− S̄
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣limt↑t2RH (t) /RL (t)− S̄
∣∣∣∣;
3. relative extraction when unconstrained changes according to
∣∣RH (T2) /RL (T2)− S̄
∣∣ > ∣∣RH (T1) /RL (T1)− S̄
∣∣;
4. relative resource rents jump according to∣∣∣∣limt↓t2pRH (t) /pRL (t)− εH/εL
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣limt↑t2pRH (t) /pRL (t)− εH/εL
∣∣∣∣;
5If Z̄2 > Z̄1, then all inequality signs in parts 1-5 are reversed.
16
5. the pollution intensity of production jumps down:
lim
t↓t2
Z (t) /Y (t) < lim
t↑t2
Z (t) /Y (t).
Proof. See Appendix.
When climate policy suddenly becomes more stringent, the constraint
is binding for a longer period (part 1 of the proposition). With a more
stringent constraint less units of carbondioxide are extracted so that it takes
longer before unconstrained emissions are below the level of the ceiling. In
reaction to tighter environmental policy the economy further increases the
productivity of the inputs in terms of emissions per unit of GDP (part 5).
The resulting relative extraction rate and relative resource rent are closer to
the results that would apply in an economy in which pollution only (rather
than scarcity) would matter.
5 Announcement effects
We now investigate how the economy reacts to an emission constraint in
the case that agents anticipate the actual implementation of the policy. In
particular, we study the path of resource extraction for the situation in
which the carbon constraint starts to be effective at time tK > 0, but is
announced at time t = 0, so that preparations can be made over the period
t ∈ (0, tK).
Agents maximize the same objective functions subject to the same con-
straints as in the previous section, with the only difference that the con-
straint (4) is now binding from t = tK instead of t = 0. For an announced
constraint, the path of relative extraction can be characterized by the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose a CO2 emission constraint is announced at time
t = 0 and introduced at time tK > 0. Let t = TA be the instant at which the
constraint ceases to be binding. Then,
17
1. when Si0 is replaced by Si (tK) and Ri (T )and Si (T ) are replaced by
Ri (TA) and Si (TA) respectively, parts 1-3(a), (c) and (d) of Proposi-
tion 1 hold for all t ∈ (tK , TA) and part (b) of parts 1-3 holds for all
t ≥ 0;
2. if SH0/SL0 < S̄,
(a) RH (t) /RL (t) = RH (TA) /RL (TA) < SH0/SL0 for all t ∈ (0, tK);
(b) SH (t) /SL (t) > SH0/SL0 for all t ∈ (0, tK);
(c) d (SH (t) /SL (t)) dt > 0 for all t ∈ (0, tK);
(d) limt↑tK RL (t) > limt↓tK RL (t);
(e) limt↑tK RH (t) < limt↓tK RH (t);
3. if SH0/SL0 > S̄, all inequalities in part 2 are reversed;
4. if SH0/SL0 = S̄, all inequalities in part 2 are replaced by equalities;
5. (a) if SH0/SL0 ≷ S̄, then limt↑tK Z (t) > limt↓tK Z (t) and
limt↑tK Z (t) /Y (t) > limt↓tK Z (t) /Y (t);
(b) if SH0/SL0 = S̄, then limt↑tK Z (t) = limt↓tK Z (t) and
limt↑tK Z (t) /Y (t) = limt↓tK Z (t) /Y (t).
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition implies that the announcement of an emission constraint
at a future date immediately causes a drop in the rate of extraction of the
relatively more productive resource (in terms of GDP per unit of emissions).
As a consequence more of this resource is conserved so that the constrained
period starts with (relatively) more of the productive resource, as compared
to the situation without announcement. At the instant the constraint be-









































Figure 2: Extraction paths for S̄ > SH(0)/SL(0): the unconstrained econ-
omy and the economy with an announced constraint
from then on relative extraction develops as would be the case with an
unanticipated constraint.
We illustrate the extraction paths for the case where SH0/SL0 < S̄ (part
2 of Proposition 3) in Figure 2 by the thick arrows. For the same case, Figure
3 illustrates the development of relative extraction and relative stocks over
time. Initially relative extraction is below relative stocks, causing an increase
in the latter, while after the introduction of the constraint relative extraction
jumps up to a level higher than that of the relative stocks, and hence the
latter decline until relative extraction and relative stocks are equal at the
instant that the constraint ceases to be binding (part 1 of the proposition).
Part 5 of the proposition states that, except for the special case where



































Figure 3: Development of relative extraction and relative stocks with an-
nounced constraint, for S̄ > SH(0)/SL(0)
is introduced. With an anticipated constraint the economy substitutes the
more productive resource (in terms of GDP per unit of CO2) for the less
productive one at the instant the constraint becomes binding, while keeping
output constant (a jump in relative extraction along the production isoquant
from RH (0) /RL (0) to RH (tK) /RL (tK) in Figure 2). As a consequence,
the economy’s pollution intensity Z/Y decreases. Since the introduction of
the constraint is expected and fully anticipated, consumption cannot jump
and substitution takes place along a production isoquant, changing emissions
but not the level of output of the final good. This is in contrast with the
case without announcement in which both emissions and output jump at
the instant the constraint is introduced.
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Comparing part 1 of Proposition 2 with parts 2-4 we see that the less
productive resource is used more intensively before the constraint becomes
binding, while the more productive resource is used more intensively from
the moment that the constraint becomes binding on. If SH0/SL0 < S̄ deple-
tion of the more dirty resource is relatively slow at first, but it is relatively
fast once the economy is constrained.
6 Concluding remarks
In reaction to a ceiling on the amount of carbondioxide emissions an economy
may want to substitute between high-carbon and low-carbon fuels. We have
shown that in the standard Hotelling model extended with a second, im-
perfectly substitutable resource, the economy optimally decreases the level
of carbondioxide per unit of GDP. However, this is not always obtained
through substitution of high-carbon for low-carbon inputs (e.g. natural gas
for coal). Initially resource users substitute towards the input which, at the
margin, has the highest level of output per unit of carbondioxide, and this
may be the input with highest level of emissions per unit of energy. Since
the total available resource stock is fixed, more intensive use of a resource
early on has to be followed by less intensive use later on and vice versa.
Thus the economy, although constrained in its emissions of carbondioxide,
either sooner or later uses relatively more of the ”dirty” input as compared
to the case where it does not face a ceiling on emissions. With an antic-
ipated constraint the economy switches towards the less productive input
(in terms of GDP per unit of carbon) before the constraint becomes binding
and jumps towards a relatively more intensive use of the more productive
input when the emission ceiling becomes binding.
The interaction between the threat of future scarcity and the cost of
current pollution is driving our results. On the one hand, scarcity of a par-
ticular resource results in a high relative price, low extraction, and high
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productivity. On the other hand, when emissions are costly, producers sub-
stitute towards the resource with highest productivity per unit of emissions,
which is the relatively scarce factor. Hence, in the short run (for given
resource stocks), tighter emission constraints imply substitution to the rel-
atively scarce resource. But then, this resource becomes even scarcer over
time and in the long run, especially when emission levels are low enough to
make the emissions constraint irrelevant, the economy must eventually use
relatively more of the initially abundant resource. The overall result is that
an emission constraint causes ”frontloading” of extraction of the scarce re-
source. This scarce resource is not necessarily the high-carbon resource: we
have established how emission and productivity coefficients, as well as the
substitution elasticity, determine which of the two resource stocks should be
considered as relatively scarce.
As long as an emission constraint is expected to be implemented in the
future, pollution costs do not directly but indirectly affect relative extrac-
tion. Agents anticipate that in the future the currently scarce resource
will be even scarcer so that they already start using less of the relatively
scarce factor now. This anticipatory action makes the scarce and produc-
tive resource more abundant at the time emissions are costly and allows the
economy to save cost.
Our results suggest that in order to cope with climate change, energy
policies should not necessarily be directed to a fast transition to low-carbon
energy sources. In addition to relative pollution content, scarcity of re-
sources, in particular expected scarcity in the post-Kyoto period, as well
as relative productivity of different energy resources should be taken into
account. Although CO2 emissions per unit of energy are larger for coal
than for oil, and although coal is much more abundant, it is at consider-
able disadvantage compared to its imperfect substitutes oil or natural gas
in for example transport activities. Hence, it remains to be seen whether a
22
shift away from coal leads to lower emissions per unit of GDP. This is an
empirical question that is left to future research.
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A Appendix
We simplify notation using variables without subscripts to denote high-
carbon to low-carbon ratios: R(t) ≡ RH(t)/RL(t), S(t) ≡ SH(t)/SL(t)
and p(t) ≡ pRH(t)/pRL(t), and similarly η ≡ ηH/ηL, ε ≡ εH/εL, and
S0 ≡ SH0/SL0. For any variable X we define X(τ−) ≡ limt↑τ X(t) and
X(τ+) ≡ limt↓τ X(t).
Before proving the propositions, we present and prove the following
lemma, which summarizes the dynamics of relative extraction R over three
relevant time periods, first when the constraint is announced but not effec-
tive, (ii) when the constraint binds, (iii) when the constraint is not binding.
Lemma 1. Let tK be the instant at which the constraint becomes binding
and TU the instant at which the constraint ceases to be binding. Then

















dτ = 0, ∀ t ∈ (tK , TU ) (A.3)
R(t) = lim
t′↑TU
R(t′), ∀ t ≥ TU . (A.4)
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where f is a function of R and parameters with f > 0 and ∂f/∂Z̄ = 0 for
all R > 0.
Proof. For all t ∈ [0, tK) ∪ [TU ,∞) we have pZ = 0 and, from (5), p (t) =
η (R (t))−1/σ. For all t ≥ TU , we have, from (11), R (t) = S (t). Since p is
constant over time (see (7)), we find p (t) = η (S (TU ))
−1/σ ∀ t; this proves
(A.1).









































From (11) the second integral in the last line equals zero. Substituting, from















Dividing out the term in brackets, substituting (4) to eliminate Z̄, and
rewriting, we find (A.3).
Prices cannot jump in absence of unexpected events due to arbitrage.
Then R can only jump if output Y jumps (see (5)), which is ruled out by
the concavity of the utility function. This proves (A.4).
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where λi ≡ εiRi/Z ∈ (0, 1) is the low-carbon’s share in emissions, θi ≡ [1 +
(η−i/ηi)(R−i/Ri)(σ−1)/σ]−1 ∈ (0, 1) is the low-carbon’s production elasticity,
and q ≡ pZZ/Y is the share of expenditures on emission permits in GDP.
Differentiating (A.5) with respect to time, using the Hotelling rules (7),
the Ramsey rule (2), using the fact that Ri/Rj = (εj/εi)λi/(1 − λi) when
differentiating θi, and using the fact that Ẑ = 0 implies λ̂i = ε̂iRi/Z = R̂i,
we find for t ∈ (tK , TU ):
(
θi(1− θi)(σ − 1)− σθi (1− λi)
(1− λi)σ
)
λ̂i = (θi − λiq) ρ + λiqq̂. (A.6)
We divide (A.6) by λi and subtract the resulting expression for the high-
carbon input from the resulting expression for the low-carbon input to elim-
inate q and rewrite to obtain:
λ̂L =
(1− λL) σρ
θL (1− θL) + (λL − θL)2 σ
(λL − θL) . (A.7)
The sign depends on the sign of λL − θL. Using the definitions of λi and
θi,we rewrite this as:




































Since by definition λL/(1 − λL) = εLRL/εHRH = 1/εR, the left-hand side
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of (A.7) can be written as:
λ̂L = − (1− λL) R̂ (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.7), and noting that both λL and θL are
functions of relative extraction R and parameters only, we find (A.2).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (A.3) implies that if R monotonically decreases over time, then
R(t) must first exceed, but eventually fall short of S(t). More generally,
for ∀ t ∈ (tK , TU ), we have: if dR(τ)/dτ Q 0, ∀τ ∈ (t, TU ), then R(t) R
S(t) R R(TU ). Equation (A.2) shows that, indeed, dR/dt cannot switch
sign between tK and TU . Hence we have:
dR(t)/dt Q 0 ⇔ (η/ε)σ R R(t) R S(t) R R(TU ), ∀ t ∈ (tK , TU ).






(S −R) . (A.10)
Combined with part (a) of the proposition, this proves (c) in part 1-3. Part
(e) then follows from (A.1) and part (a) of the proposition. Part (b) follows
from (e) and (12). Part (f) follows from (11) and part (a) of the proposition.
This completes the proof of parts 1-3 of proposition 1.
Finally we need to prove part 4. From (3) and (4) we find that Z/Y is














so that Z/Y reaches a minimum for R = (η/ε)σ ≡ S̄ and increases in |R−S̄|.
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proves part 4(a). From 1(e) and (11), we have
∣∣R(0−)− S̄∣∣ =
∣∣S0 − S̄
∣∣ < ∣∣R(T )− S̄∣∣ . This proves part 4(b). Part 4(c) follows from 1(a)
and 1(d), and 4(d) follows from (11).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove part 1 by using the procedure we used in the main text and derive
T2 from (9), (10), and (A.4) in the following way:
εHSH0 + εLSL0 = [εH (SH0 − SH(t2) + SH(t2)− SH(T2))
+εL (SL0 − SL(t2) + SL(t2)− SL(T2))]
+εHSH(T2) + εLSL(T2)


















T1 − T2 =
(





This explicitly solves for T2. Since by assumption the new constraint is
binding when introduced, we must have t2 < T2, and hence T2 T T1 ⇐⇒
Z̄1 S Z̄2, which proves part 1.
For part 2-4 we focus on the case where SH0/SL0 < (η/ε)
σ ≡ S̄, the
proofs for the other cases are analogous. We continue the notation of the
proof of Proposition 1. Since ∂f/∂Z̄ = 0 in (A.2), a decline in Z̄ affects
the equilibrium path of R(t) only through an increase in T . Write Ro(t)
and Rn(t) for relative extraction with the old and the new value for Z̄
respectively. Suppose the unexpected change in the constraint would not
on impact change relative extraction, i.e. Rn(t+2 ) = R
o(t+2 ). Then, from
(A.2), Rn (t) = Ro (t) ∀ t ∈ (t2, T1], but Rn (t) < Ro (t) ∀ t ∈ (T1, T2) and
the integral at the left-hand side of (A.3) with R = Rn, t = t2 and TU = T2
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exceeds the integral with R = Ro, t = t2 and TU = T1. But this violates the
equality in (A.3) for the new path. If Rn(t+2 ) < R
o(t+2 ), then the integral for
the new path is positive a fortiori. Hence, we must have Rn(t+2 ) > R
o(t+2 ),
which proves part 2 of the proposition.
We prove part 3 in a similar way. Suppose Rn(T2) = Ro(T1), then
Rn(t) = Ro(t − T2 + T1) for t ∈ (t2 + T2 − T1, T2) and Rn(t) > Ro(t2) for
t ∈ (t2, t2 + T2 − T1). But then (A.3) is violated on the new path since the
integral becomes positive. A fortiori (A.3) is violated with Rn(T2) > Ro(T1).
Hence we must have Ro(T1) > Rn(T2).
Combining the results in part 3 with (A.1), we find Ro(T1) = So(T1) >
Sn(T2) = Rn(T2). From (12), we then have po(T1) < pn(T2). Since p > ε
(from proposition 1, part 1b), and relative resource rents are constant over
time (from (7)), we prove part 4.
Part 5 directly follows from part 4 of Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of the first part of the proposition follows the proof of Proposition
1 and is omitted.
In part 2-4, (a), the equality follows from (11) and (A.1); the inequality
follows from (e) in part 1-3 in proposition 1.
Assume that S (tK) < (η/ε)
σ ≡ S̄. Then, from part 1 of the proposition
and (A.10), we have
S (tK) > S (TA) . (A.11)
Suppose S0 ≤ R(0+). Then from (A.1), (A.4), and (A.10) the relative stock
has to jump up at t = tK for (A.11) to hold, which violates continuity of
stocks. So S0 > R(0+) = S(TA). It follows from (A.10) that dS/dt >
0 ∀ t ∈ (0, tK) so that S0 < S(tK). Since we started from the assumption
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S(tK) < S̄, we must have S0 < S̄. This completes the proofs of parts
2(a)-(c); the proofs of parts 3 and 4, (a)-(c) are analogous and are omitted.
Arbitrage prevents resource rents to jump, so from (7) r is finite and
from (2) income cannot jump. Since the emissions constraint starts to be
binding at t = tK by construction, either emissions jump down and hence
emissions per unit of income jump down at t = tK , or emissions do not jump
and neither do emissions per unit of output. The latter requires that relative
extraction does not jump, which requires S0 = S̄, see part 4(a)-(c). This
proves parts 4(d) and (e) and 5(b). The former, a jump down in emissions
with continuous income, requires a jump along a production isoquant. Hence
Z/Y falls and RL and RH move in opposite directions. Consider the case
S0 < S̄. Then from part 2, (a), we have R(0+) = R(t−K) = S(TA) < S̄, and
from part 1 of this proposition R(t+K) > S(tK) > S(TA), so that R(t
+
K) >
R(t−K). That is, at time tK , R jumps up, so that RH jumps up and RL
jumps down. Using the same procedure for the case S0 > S̄, we find that
RH jumps up and RL jumps down. This proves parts (d) and (e) of parts
2-3 and (a) of part 5.
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